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THE UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Stuart P. Green* 
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW. By George P. Fletcher. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 223. Cloth, $45; paper, 
$18.95. 
There is something about the criminal law that invites comparative 
analysis. The interests it protects are so basic, and its concerns so fun­
damental, that it is natural to ask whether there are aspects of criminal 
law that are somehow universal. We want to know whether familiar 
concepts such as murder and manslaughter, intent and negligence, and 
insanity and mistake, are characteristic of other systems of criminal 
law as well, and, if so, what role they play there. 
In the last generation, no criminal law scholar has made better use 
of comparative law techniques than George Fletcher, the Cardozo 
Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia Law School. And, not coinci­
dentally, no scholar has done more to define and probe the fundamen­
tal principles of our own system of criminal justice. Now, twenty years 
after the publication of his classic Rethinking Criminal Law,1 Fletcher 
offers Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, a concise, fair-minded, and 
remarkably clear synthesis of virtually all of the major debates in con­
temporary criminal law theory. 
Basic Concepts should be of interest to at least three groups of 
readers. The first group comprises students in advanced criminal law 
classes, who will benefit from Fletcher's gift for finding concrete lan­
guage to explain abstract concepts. The second group consists of 
teachers and scholars of substantive criminal law, who will want to see 
how Fletcher has clarified and augmented many of the arguments first 
made in Rethinking. The third group is potentially much broader. 
The most novel and provocative feature of Basic Concepts is its claim 
to offer a "deep structure" or "universal grammar" of criminal law, 
one that "transcends the enacted law of particular states and coun-
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. B.A. 1983, Tufts University; 
J.D. 1988, Yale Law School. - Ed. I am grateful to Hugo Bedau, Jay Bybee, Nora 
Demleitner, Markus Dubber, Michael Hegarty, and Jim Whitman for their helpful com­
ments on an earlier draft. I am also pleased to acknowledge the financial support of the 
Louisiana Bar Foundation (whose views are not necessarily reflected herein). 
1. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978) [hereinafter 
RETHINKING]. 
2104 
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tries" (p. 23) and "facilitate[s an] appreciation of the unity of the 
world's legal systems" (p. 5). This aspect of the book will be of inter­
est to comparativists and theorists in various areas of the law, who 
share with Fletcher an interest in the possibility of finding timeless and 
universal principles that underlie their respective disciplines.2 
The focus of this Review is on the claim of universality and the in­
novative theoretical framework on which that claim rests. Part I 
briefly describes the overall design of Fletcher's project, cataloguing 
its principal virtues and defects. Part II then explores the concepts of 
deep structure, universal grammar, and other kinds of human univer­
sals as they are used in other disciplines, including linguistics and an­
thropology. Finally, Part III seeks to test the validity of Fletcher's 
theory by applying it to a collection of seemingly anomalous criminal 
law practices and concepts from China, Japan, Iceland, Melanesia, and 
elsewhere. Through this process, I hope to demonstrate both the po­
tential and the limitations of Fletcher's theory. 
I. BASIC CONCEPTS- DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
For legal theorists, the goal of Basic Concepts is an enormously at­
tractive one: to "take a step back from the details and the linguistic 
variations of the criminal codes" (p. 4), to apply "philosophical and 
conceptual analysis" (p. 23), and thereby find "an underlying unity," a 
"deep structure" or "universal grammar" (p. 5), a "philosophical di­
mension" (p. vii) common to "diverse systems of criminal justice" (p. 
4). How is this goal to be pursued? Fletcher's approach is simple and 
elegant. Each of the twelve chapters of Basic Concepts deals with one 
of twelve "dichotomies" or "distinctions" that are said to "shape and 
guide the controversies that inevitably break out in every system of 
criminal justice" (p. 4).3 These dichotomies, he says, form a common 
2. As Fletcher himself has recently written, "[t]he search for structural features of the 
law, the elaboration of distinctions common to all legal cultures, the clarification of the basic 
units of legal analysis - all of these are intellectual pursuits that unite scholars from diverse 
traditions in a common pursuit." George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Dis­
cipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 693-94 (1998). 
3. The twelve dichotomies are as follows: 
(1) What is the difference between substantive and procedural criminal law? 
(2) How do we mark the boundaries between criminal punishment and other coercive sanc­
tions, such as deportation, that are burdensome but not punitive? 
(3) What is the difference between treating a suspect as a subject and treating him as an ob­
ject, both in terms of the criminal act and the trial? 
( 4) What is the difference between causing harm and harm simply occurring as a natural 
event? 
(5) What is the difference between determining whether a crime has occurred (wrongdoing) 
and attributing that wrongdoing to a particular offender? 
( 6) What is the distinction between offenses and defenses? 
(7) How should we distinguish between intentional and negligent crimes? 
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"deep structure" of criminal law. The issues raised by these dichoto­
mies are resolved in different ways by different systems, thereby cre­
ating variations in "surface structure," or positive law. 
As a means for structuring his analysis, the dichotomy approach 
works superbly. By allowing the reader to focus directly on major 
points of controversy, the book offers considerable advantages over 
the more traditional "grand theory" approach to criminal law used in 
recent years by scholars such as Andrew Ashworth,4 Hyman Gross,5 
Douglas Husak,6 Nicola Lacey and Celia Wells,7 Michael Moore,8 Paul 
Robinson,9 and, indeed, by Fletcher himself.10 
But the dichotomy approach has its drawbacks as well. First, it 
tends to impose a theoretical straitjacket, forcing Fletcher to contrive 
distinctions that do little to illuminate his subject. The "punishment 
versus treatment" dichotomy, for example, turns out to be little more 
than a vehicle for Fletcher's discussion of punishment, with the ques­
tion of "treatment" quickly pushed to the periphery. The same can be 
said of his discussion concerning the "justice versus legality" dichot­
omy, in which Fletcher's focus is almost wholly on the meaning of le­
gality. 
Second, there is, at times, a certain vagueness about the difference 
between surface and deep structure. Surface structure is supposed to 
be found in "statutory rules and case law decisions," whereas deep 
structure is said to be found in the "debates that recur in fact in every 
legal culture" (p. 4). But it is obvious that many of the questions 
Fletcher identifies as indicative of deep structure (e.g., "how should 
(8) Why should there be defenses both of selfdefense and necessity, and what is the distinc­
tion between them? 
(9) Why are some mistakes relevant to criminal liability and others irrelevant? 
(10) How should we distinguish between completed offenses and attempts and other inchoate 
crimes? 
(11) What is the difference between someone who is a perpetrator of an offense and some­
one who is a mere accessory to the offense? 
(12) How do we distinguish between legality and justice in the criminal process? 
4. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed. 1999). 
5. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979). 
6. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (1987). 
7. NICOLA LACEY & CELIA WELLS, RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL LAW {2d ed. 1998). 
8. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(1997). 
9. PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FuNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW {1997). 
10. RETHINKING, supra note 1. For further reflections on various approaches to crimi­
nal law theorizing, see MOORE, supra note 8, at 3-80 (discussing the kinds of questions a 
theory of criminal Jaw ought to consider); Nicola Lacey, Contingency, Coherence, and Con­
ceptualism: Reflections on the Encounter Between "Critique" and "the Philosophy of the 
Criminal Law," in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 9, 48 (Antony Duff ed., 1998) 
(distinguishing between "philosophical" and "critical," or doctrinal, theories of criminal 
Jaw). 
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we distinguish between completed offenses and attempts and other in­
choate crimes?" and "what is the difference between someone who is 
a perpetrator of an offense and someone who is a mere accessory to 
the offense?") are precisely the sort of questions that statutes and case 
law seek to resolve. What Fletcher presumably means - although he 
is never particularly clear on this point - is that deep structure con­
sists not of the rules for determining, say, whether a defendant is a 
perpetrator or an accomplice, but simply of the fact that there are such 
distinctions in the criminal law, and that these distinctions can be ob­
served widely, even universally. 
Third, the dichotomy format means that a handful of important is­
sues either tum up in unexpected places (e.g., the discussion of both 
insanity and criminal omissions is found, curiously, in a chapter enti­
tled "Subject versus Object"), or are left out entirely. Two omissions 
are particularly worth mentioning. One is Fletcher's failure to deal 
with the question of the extent to which criminal law is necessarily a 
matter of public rather than private law.11 Another, even more impor­
tant, omission is the almost complete lack of attention to the subject of 
specific offenses (even in a chapter entitled "Offenses versus De­
fenses"). As we will see below, if anything is universal in criminal law, 
it is almost certainly the prohibition of murder, rape, and other forms 
of violence.12 Yet Fletcher offers few insights as to why some acts are 
widely (even universally) criminalized, while others are not.13 Instead, 
like most contemporary criminal law theorists, he is preoccupied with 
the criminal law's general part.14 
11. For example, Basic Concepts gives curiously little attention to the important ques­
tion of standing - who is the proper party to bring a criminal case, and what that might tell 
us about the extent to which the criminal law reflects public, as opposed to private, interests. 
Fletcher mentions the issue only in passing, stating that "[i]n the United States and in most 
parts of the common law world today, the public prosecutor claims exclusive authority to 
seek punishment for crimes committed against private individuals." P. 36. But he has al­
most nothing to say about the extent to which the public aspect of criminal prosecutions 
might itself be part of the criminal law's deep structure. 
12 See infra note 32 and accompanying text Another good candidate for universality is 
the classification of offenses according to the nature and degree of hannfulness, which I dis­
cuss in Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Offenses: Federal Rule of Evidence 
609(a)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 
2000). 
13. It is worth noting that simply because some practice is universal does not necessarily 
mean that it is part of a "universal grammar." As used by Fletcher, universal grammar refers 
to a set of generalizable abstract principles that can be derived from the observation of wide­
spread or universal practices. Thus, the fact that criminal offenses such as murder and rape 
are universally prohibited might lead one to derive some more general principle regarding 
the criminalization of certain kinds of harmful and intentional acts. For more on the various 
meanings of "universal," see infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
14. I have discussed criminal law scholarship's preoccupation with the general part 
elsewhere. See Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a Re­
vised Model Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2000). For a recent example, see LEO KATZ ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF 
2108 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2104 
Fourth, although the various horns of Fletcher's dichotomies fre­
quently do delineate the range of choices that legal systems make with 
respect to specific issues in criminal law, there is little explanation of 
how and why particular systems make the choices they do within such 
ranges. To put it another way, while the dichotomy approach does a 
good job of explaining what is similar across systems, it is much less 
concerned with the way in which various universals express themselves 
differently in different environments. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Fletcher fails to offer any 
meta-theory that would explain the deeper meaning of his dichoto­
mies. For example, there is no explanation as to why the criminal law 
reflects these dichotomies and not others, whether the dichotomy 
structure is also characteristic of other areas of the law, and what the 
ultimate source of such dichotomies might be.15 In the end, what 
Fletcher provides is an exceptionally well-informed and insightful 
collection of deep-seated and widely observed distinctions in criminal 
law. What remains unclear are his views on the larger significance of 
that collection. 
II. THE SEARCH FOR "DEEP STRUCTURE," "UNIVERSAL 
GRAMMAR," AND "HUMAN UNIVERSALS" 
Early in Basic Concepts, Fletcher tells us that the "deep structure" 
or "universal grammar" he is pursuing is akin to Noam Chomsky's fa­
mous work in linguistics.16 To assess Fletcher's project, then, it will be 
helpful to know both what these terms mean for Chomsky, and what 
they might mean to Fletcher. In addition, we will want to know some­
thing about other kinds of "human universals" that might be relevant 
to the study of criminal law. 
A. What Linguists Mean by "Deep Structure" and 
"Universal Grammar" 
As he himself has acknowledged elsewhere, Fletcher is hardly the 
first legal scholar to assert that he is pursuing a Chomsky-like proj-
CRIMINAL LAW 4 (1999) (stating that book on foundations of criminal law will consider only 
the general part). 
15. For a discussion of the possible shape of such a meta-theory, see infra note 32. 
16. P. 5 ("As Noam Chomsky developed a universal grammar underlying all the par­
ticular languages of the world, here, in these twelve distinctions lies the grammar of criminal 
law."). Chomsky's most influential account of transformational grammar can be found in 
NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF 1HE THEORY OF SYNTAX (1965); NOAM CHOMSKY, 
SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957). For a useful introduction to Chomsky's work, see JOHN 
LYONS, NOAM CHOMSKY (1970). 
May 2000] Universal Grammar of Criminal Law 2109 
ect.17 Yet such scholars have offered almost no discussion of either 
what the Chomskyian project actually consists of, or the extent to 
which Chomsky's work provides them with a plausible theoretical 
model. 
At the outset, it should be clear that linguists use the terms "deep 
structure" and "universal grammar" to refer to quite different con­
cepts. Linguists attempt to offer an analysis of language that explains 
how and why certain word strings can be recognized as well-formed 
sentences by native speakers. Although there is an infinite number of 
sentences that can be formed in any language, it is possible to identify 
a finite collection of "phrase structure rules" and "lexical insertion 
rules" that build "base component" trees, the underlying structures of 
well-formed sentences.18 These "deep structures," or "ct-structures," 
are then converted into one or more actual sentences (known as "sur­
face structures" or "s-structures") by the application of linguistic de­
vices known as "transformations." The whole system, consisting of 
base components plus transformations, is known as "generative" or 
"transformational grammar."19 
"Universal grammar," as its name suggests, refers to something 
quite different from the language-specific deep structures of genera­
tive grammar.20 The basic idea of universal grammar is that there are 
certain "principles," or "super-rules," that are genetically "wired" into 
our brains.21 These innate principles become instantiated as the de­
terminate grammar of a particular language when the parameters of 
universal grammar are set, and thereby explain how it is that children 
are able, so easily and so quickly, to learn something as complex as 
their native language. The term "universal grammar" is therefore 
used to refer both to "the basic design underlying the grammars of all 
17. See George P. Fletcher, What Law is Like, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1599, 1604 n.22 (1997) 
(citing numerous law review articles that have used the term "deep structure"). 
18. See CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES, supra note 16. 
19. Id. It should be noted, however, that in his later work Chomsky no longer relies on 
the notion of deep structures. See, e.g. , NOAM CHOMSKY, THE MINIMALIST PROGRAM 
(1995). 
20. Chomsky himself has noted the frequent confusion between deep structure and uni­
versal grammar. See NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND REsPONSIBILITY 171-72 (1977) ("I 
have often read that what I am proposing is that deep structures do not vary from one lan­
guage to another, that all languages have the same deep structure: people have apparently 
been misled by the word deep and confuse it with invariant. Once again, the only thing I 
claim to be 'invariant' is universal grammar."). For an example of such confusion, see D.L. 
Perrott, Has Law a Deep Structure? - The Origin of Fundamental Duties, in 
FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES 1 (D. Lasok et al. eds., 1980). 
21. Chomsky's claims regarding universal grammar can be found, among other places, in 
Noam Chomsky, Linguistics and Cognitive Science: Problems and Mysteries, in LANGUAGE 
IN Focus: FOUNDATIONS, METHODS AND SYSTEMS: EsSAYS IN MEMORY OF YEHOSHUA 
BAR-HILLEL (A. Kasher ed., 1991); CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX, su­
pra note 16, at 25. 
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human languages" and to "the circuitry in children's brains that allows 
them to learn the grammar of their parents' language."22 
With respect to universal grammar, a considerable amount of em­
pirical evidence has tended to substantiate Chomsky's claims. Starting 
in the early 1960s, for example, a team of scholars led by Joseph 
Greenberg examined a sample of thirty languages from five conti­
nents, including Basque, Berber, Burmese, Finnish, Hebrew, Hindi, 
Italian, Japanese, Malay, Maori, Massai, Mayan, Nubian, Quechua, 
Serbian, Swahili, and Turkish.23 In these early studies, which focused 
on word order and morphemes, researchers found no fewer than forty­
five universals. Since then, according to linguist and cognitive scientist 
Steven Pinker, "many other surveys have been conducted, involving 
scores of languages from every part of the world, and literally hun­
dreds of universal patterns have been documented."24 
B. What Anthropologists Mean by Human Universals 
The idea that there is an empirically verifiable, innate, or at least 
universal, quality to something as apparently culture-specific as lan­
guage is, of course, an enormously intriguing one. If it is possible to 
prove that human language, in all of its tremendous variety, has an 
underlying and unchanging unity, then it may well be possible to find 
proof of underlying universals in other realms of human behavior as 
well - including, perhaps, morality, manners, social hierarchy, family 
dynamics, humor, music, art, or even law. Inspired in part by the work 
of Chomsky and Greenberg, a number of ethnographers in recent 
years have turned from the anthropologist's traditional focus on cul­
tural differences to a renewed interest in finding human commonalities 
(or universals, as they tend to be called) - behavioral patterns and 
22. CHOMSKY, AsPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 16, at 27-30; STEVEN 
PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 483 (1994). 
23. See UNIVERSALS OF LANGUAGE (J.H. Greenberg ed., 1963). Greenberg and his 
colleagues were not explicitly attempting to confirm Chomsky's hypotheses, but many of 
their .findings have nevertheless had that effect. See PINKER, supra note 22, at 233. 
24. PINKER, supra note 22, at 233. According to Pinker: 
Some [universal patterns] hold absolutely. For example, no language forms questions by re­
versing the order of words within a sentence, like Built Jack that house the this is? Some are 
statistical: subjects normally precede objects in almost all languages, and verbs and their 
objects tend to be adjacent. . . .  The largest number of universals involve implications: if a 
language has X, it will also have Y . . . .  Universal implications are found in all aspects of lan­
guage . . .  [including meaning]: if a language has a word for "purple," it will have a word for 
"red"; if a language has a word for "leg," it will have a word for "arm." 
Id. at 233-34. "What is most striking of all," according to Pinker, "is that we can look at a 
randomly picked language and find things that can sensibly be called subjects, objects, and 
verbs." Id. at 236. \Vhat has been demonstrated, he says, is "that the same symbol­
manipulating machinery, without exception, underlies the world's languages." Id. at 237. 
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practices that are the same regardless of cultural and ethnic bounda­
ries.25 
Anthropologists use the term universal in a variety of different 
contexts. Some universals exist at the level of the individual, or at 
least in every individual of a certain sex or age range; examples are 
certain emotions and facial expressions.26 A second kind of universal 
exists at the level of society (generally defined as the manner in which 
individuals or groups relate to and among each other); an example is 
the sexual division of labor.27 A third kind of universal exists at the 
level of culture (a term which refers to conventional patterns of 
thought, activity, and artifact that are passed from generation to gen­
eration); examples of this kind of universal are tools and kinship ter­
minologies.28 In addition, distinctions are often drawn between "sub­
stantive" and "formal" universals29; and "conditional" and 
"unconditional" universals.3° Finally, we might distinguish between 
those practices or ideas that are universal merely in the sense that they 
occur at some time in every culture, and those practices or ideas that 
occur (comprehensively) in every relevant case in every culture. 
As in the case of linguistic universals, the search for individual, cul­
tural, and societal universals has been quite promising. Evidence of 
universals of one kind or another has been found in matters as diverse 
as sexual jealousy and Oedipal feelings; adornment of bodies and ar-
25. See, e.g., DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991); ROBIN Fox, THE RED 
LAMP OF INCEST (1980). The traditional anthropological approach is exemplified most fa­
mously by the ethnographic works of Margaret Mead. See, e.g., MARGARET MEAD, 
COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA (1936). For a critique of Mead's work in Samoa, see DEREK 
FREEMAN, MARGARET MEAD AND SAMOA: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF AN 
ANTHROPOLOGICALMYTH (1983). 
26. See BROWN, supra note 25, at 39. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. at 40. 
29. As Chomsky has characterized the distinction (referring to universals in language): 
A theory of substantive universals claims that items of a particular kind in any language 
must be drawn from a fixed class of items . . . .  A theory of substantive semantic universals 
might hold for example, that certain designative functions must be carried out in a specified 
way in each language. Thus it might assert that each language will contain terms that desig­
nate persons or lexical items referring to certain specific kinds of objects, feelings, behavior, 
and so on. 
It is also possible, however, to search for universal properties of a more abstract sort. Con­
sider a claim that the grammar of every language meets certain specified formal conditions. 
The truth of this hypothesis would not in itself imply that any particular rule must appear in 
all or even in any two grammars. The property of having a grammar meeting a certain ab­
stract condition might be called a formal linguistic universal, if shown to be a general prop­
erty of natural languages. 
CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 16, at 28-29. 
30. An "implicational" or "conditional" universal (in contrast to an "unrestricted" or 
"non-conditional" universal) is a trait or complex that appears if and only if certain condi­
tions obtain - for example, "all societies possessing paved highways possess centralized 
government." See BROWN, supra note 25, at 45. 
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rangement of hair; recognized facial expressions of happiness, sadness, 
anger, fear, disgust, and contempt; food taboos and fondness for 
sweets; gifts and the exchange of labor, goods, and services; and logical 
relations including and, not, same, equivalence, opposites, general ver­
sus particular, and part versus whole.31 In addition, anthropologists 
have found a number of universals that are directly relevant to the 
criminal law - including concepts like intention, responsibility, rights, 
and property; distinctions between voluntary and involuntary behav­
ior; procedures for seeking redress of wrongs; government, in the 
sense of binding collective decisions about public affairs; institutions 
for punishment; and "legal" prohibitions on rape, murder, and other 
forms of violence.32 
C. Fletcher and the Search for Universals in Law 
If these linguists and anthropologists are right, if human beings 
really do share universal norms and practices of these sorts, what im­
plications might there be for our understanding of law in general, and 
the criminal law in particular?33 Fletcher never tells us precisely what 
he has in mind here, although at least two possibilities can be ruled 
out. First, it seems clear that when Fletcher invokes Chomsky, he. 
is 
31. See id. Brown's findings are helpfully summarized in PINKER, supra note 22, at 412-
15. 
32. See BROWN, supra note 25, at 69, 134-39, 176-78, 182. Assuming that such concepts, 
distinctions, procedures, institutions, and prohibitions are in fact universal, the next question 
we would need to ask is: How did they get that way? Among the possible kinds of explana­
tions that might be offered are the following: 
(1) Diffusionist Explanation: Some cultural practices, such as cooking and the use of fire, 
seem to have been invented in some small number of societies and then spread widely 
throughout the world in a process known as "diffusion." To develop a diffusionist theory of 
criminal law, we would need to compile evidence that various criminal law concepts (such as, 
say, accomplice liability or the principle of legality) developed in a similar manner. 
(2) Physical Explanation: Some aspects of culture are thought to be a response to certain 
physical characteristics in humans. For example, various kinship roles seem to be a response 
to the physical requirements of sexual reproduction. Under a physical theory of criminal 
law, concepts such as rape and murder might be viewed as a response to conflicting human 
tendencies towards, say, violence (on the one hand) and the desire for physical safety (on the 
other). 
(3) Evolutionary Explanation: Many forms of human behavior are believed to be the prod­
uct of evolved human characteristics - the result of natural selection, the process by which 
better adapted organisms outbreed those that are less well adapted. Under an evolutionary 
theory, certain aspects of criminal law (again, the prohibitions on rape and murder provide a 
good example) would be viewed as analogous forms of adaptation. 
For a survey of the literature concerning these and others explanations for human universals, 
see id. at 88-117. 
33. Other legal scholars have begun dealing with similar issues. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Law 
as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1279 (1995) ("The existence 
of universal gra=ar reinforces the discovery of universals in other language-based disci­
plines."); John 0. McGinnis, The Human Constitution and Constitutive Law: A Prolegome­
non, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211 (1997) (suggesting that work in the social sciences 
involving evolutionary theories of human nature should begin to inform legal scholarship). 
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not referring to the search for some finite set of underlying rules (a 
deep structure) from which an infinite number of legal propositions 
(the surface structure) can be derived - a process that would be 
analogous to the transformations that occur in linguistic theory. Nor 
does he suggest that human beings share some genetic predisposition, 
some "hard wiring" in our brains that manifests itself in different sur­
face structures, norms, or behaviors that, in turn, give content to the 
criminal law.34 
Rather, what Fletcher seems to be claiming is simply that there is, 
in his words, some "underlying unity among diverse systems of crimi­
nal justice," some "basic design" that is common to all of these various 
and disparate systems. To put it another way, what Fletcher seems to 
be saying is that, if a society does develop a system of criminal jus­
tice,35 then that system will possess characteristics that are contained in 
the continuum marked out by his collection of dichotomies. 
Ill. TEsTING FLETCHER'S CLAIM OF UNIVERSALITY 
Just as linguistic anthropologists have done fieldwork intended to 
confirm the theoretical construct developed by Chomsky, it is natural 
to ask whether empirical evidence could be found to support the thesis 
developed by Fletcher. But how exactly does one "test" a universal 
theory of law? 
As noted above, anthropologists have had some success in discov­
ering universals that are relevant to the criminal law.36 Nevertheless, 
there is obviously a wide conceptual gap between generalized criminal 
law universals of this sort and criminal law universals of the sort pos­
ited by Fletcher. That is, even if there were evidence that every cul­
ture, say, distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary behavior, 
or imposes basic legal prohibitions on murder and rape, one might still 
34. For an example of such reasoning, see Perrott, supra note 20, at 10. 
35. There may, of course, be societies that never actually develop such a system. One 
such possible exception is the Ifugao tribe of the Philippines, described in E. Adamson 
Hoebel's survey of literature on the world's legal cultures: 
By virtue of the nature of Ifugao social organization there can be no criminal acts. All other 
legally recognized offenses are of the type known in Anglo-American law as torts: private 
(or civil) wrongs or injuries independent of contract Among the Ifugao the responsibility 
for initiating any prosecution rests with the aggrieved; any damages, penal assessments, or 
physical punishment inflicted upon the defendant are imposed by the plaintiff and his kins­
men. The lines of procedure are anything but raw self-help, however. Custom requires that 
proper procedural protocol be carefully exhausted before resort to direct seizure of the lance 
is taken. 
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
DYNAMICS 113-14 (1967) {footnotes omitted) (citing R.F. BARTON, lFuGAO LAW {1919)). 
Unfortunately, as noted supra note 11 and accompanying text, one of the important issues 
on which Fletcher has little to say in Basic Concepts is the extent to which a system of public, 
as opposed to private, prosecutions is fundamental to the idea of a criminal law. 
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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be skeptical about the claim that every criminal law system recognizes 
more refined distinctions such as those between self-defense and ne­
cessity, or perpetration and complicity. If we are to find evidence of 
those kinds of distinctions, we need to go beyond the findings of the 
anthropologists. 
There are two ways in which Fletcher's theory might be tested. 
One is to take the theory articulated in Basic Concepts and attempt to 
apply it, in toto, to various criminal law systems around the world. In­
deed, this seems to be exactly what Fletcher has in mind. He tell us 
that there are plans to publish the book in various foreign editions, in 
which "a local commentator takes charge of the translation and adds 
material on the way the twelve universal distinctions . . .  find expres­
sion in local positive law."37 
Unfortunately, this process is likely to take years to complete. A 
book review calls for something more expedient. Rather than using 
Fletcher's approach to examine foreign criminal law systems in their 
entirety, I suggest that we use it to look at a collection of specific for­
eign criminal practices and principles. In particular, I propose that we 
take a collection of specific criminal law practices and principles that 
Fletcher himself does not consider, and which, from the perspective of 
contemporary Western practice, may seem anomalous; and then ask 
whether and to what extent Fletcher's theory can provide an adequate 
account. 
A. Six Case Studies 
Viewing Fletcher's theory through the lens of the six case studies 
presented here should prove useful in several ways. By applying the 
theory to the specifics of various legal systems, we will be able to as­
sess its reliability and comprehensiveness, confirm its significance, 
question its premises, and suggest possible modifications. In addition, 
if the theory is a good one, it should yield valuable insights into the 
specific legal rules and principles that are the subject of our case stud­
ies.38 
37. P. vii. One can only hope that Fletcher's foreign publishers serve him better than his 
prestigious English language publisher, which has released the book with a distracting num­
ber of typographical errors. See e.g., p. 14 ("The evidence on that evidence [sic] is simply 
inconclusive."); p. 45 ("it follows from the above syllogism - that there would be something 
just [sic] or conceptually untoward about punishing the bystander."); p. 111 ("These are case 
[sic] of intentional conduct . . . .  "); p. 114 ("Suppose that absentmindedly you leave the Ji. 
brary without having first having [sic] checked out the book you were reading."); p. 123 
("Does Oswald want or desire to injury [sic] either JFK or Connally?"); p. 125 ("If Oswald 
acts intentionally regardless of the gun pointed at his head, how he [sic] could possibly es­
cape liability for murder?"); p. 126 ("Oswald suddenly turned on the KGB agent and 
grabbed the latter's rifle, causing it [sic] discharge in the direction of the crowd below."). 
38. Cf. RICHARD s. KAYNE, FRENCH SYNTAX: THE TRANSFORMATIONAL CYCLE xviii 
(1975) (stating similar goals for study that uses French syntax as case study in test of 
Chomskyian transformational grammar). 
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Before I catalogue the cases, though, several. comments are in or­
der. First, it should be noted that most, though not all, of the exam­
ples are historical. This departs from Fletcher's own orientation to 
contemporary legal systems, but is nevertheless well within the claims 
of a universal theory. Indeed, Fletcher has elsewhere referred to his 
dichotomies as involving "eternal questions,"39 and it seems reason­
able to infer that his goal is to develop a universal theory that can ac­
count for historical, as well as contemporary, practices. 
It is also worth noting that the countries from which my examples 
come are mostly non-Western. This focus will, I hope, provide a 
useful antidote to the Western bias in Fletcher's own scholarship. 
William Ewald has described the tendency among theorists to "elevate 
the local rules of [their] own time and place into universal truths for all 
humanity."40 With his deep knowledge of German and Anglo­
American legal history and jurisprudence, and his respectable 
acquaintance with Italian, French, Spanish, Israeli, and Talmudic 
criminal law, Fletcher is certainly less guilty of this vice than other 
scholars. Yet even such considerable erudition cannot, without more, 
justify a claim of universality. 
Finally, it should be recognized that the descriptions offered below 
have been drawn primarily from secondhand accounts of foreign law. 
I have not sought to confirm independently the validity of the inter­
pretations offered. Nor, in general, have I sought to provide a broader 
context for the practices discussed. In my attempt to test the flexibility 
of Fletcher's theory, I have more or less taken the descriptions at face 
value. 
Here, then, is a range of criminal law principles and practices that, 
from the perspective of contemporary Western legal systems, should 
strike the reader as anomalous: 
• Much of Western legal history has witnessed cases involving the 
criminal prosecution and punishment of animals and inanimate 
objects. The Book of Exodus, for example, provides that an ox 
that gores a man or woman to death is to be stoned, and its flesh 
not eaten. The ancient Greeks regularly held trials involving both 
animals and inanimate things (e.g., stones, beams, and pieces of 
39. George Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 
285-86 (1998) ("These basic concepts of criminal justice are philosophical and conceptual in 
nature. They possess a truth value that cannot be resolved by an act of law-making will. A 
legislature can no more resolve a philosophical problem than it can determine a matter of 
scientific controversy . . . .  Codes must be understood, therefore, as tentative answers to eter­
nal questions. Scholars must remain committed to probing the depths of those eternal ques­
tions, whatever the local code may say on the matter."). 
40. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like To Try A Rat?, 
143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 1958 (1995). Ewald goes on: "[I]ndeed, as is well known, the great 
systems of Natural Law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were largely rearrange­
ments of the rules of Justinian's Digest." Id. 
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iron that had caused the death of a person by falling on him).41 
Barthelemy Chassenee, a leading French lawyer and scholar of 
the sixteenth century, wrote A Treatise on the Excommunication 
of Insects, which discusses the full range of issues that would be 
expected to arise during a trial of insects, and offers a theoretical 
analysis of the issues raised by the prosecution of animals more 
generally, including "a careful distinction between punitive 
prosecutions of animals, and prosecutions that are merely in­
tended to deter future harmful conduct."42 
• Crime and Custom in Savage Society, Bronislaw Malinowski's 
seminal work of legal anthropology, published in 1926, describes 
the early twentieth century legal culture of the Trobriand Islands 
in Melanesia.43 Although many legal practices in Melanesian so­
ciety seem vague, Malinowski describes a striking incident of 
what he regards as a paradigmatic exercise of criminal justice: A 
young man was having a sexual relationship with his maternal 
cousin, the daughter of his mother's sister - a relationship that 
was prohibited by Trobriand law. When the affair was discovered 
by a rival lover, the rival insulted the offending man in public, ac­
cusing him of incest. "For this,'' Malinowski tells us, "there was 
only one remedy; only one means of escape remained to the un­
fortunate youth. Next morning he put on festive attire and orna­
mentation, climbed a coco-nut [sic] palm and addressed the 
community, speaking from among the palm leaves and bidding 
them farewell . . . . Then he wailed aloud, as is the custom, 
jumped from a palm some sixty feet high and was killed on the 
spot."44 
• The criminal law of mediaeval Iceland (around the year 800) was 
dominated by an elaborate system of rules regarding revenge. 
According to one commentator, "an individual was not regarded 
as a separate being to the same extent as he is today, but was 
looked upon as a link in the long family chain. It was the family 
that was responsible for right and wrong, for revenge, and for de­
fending its own reputation. The duty to take revenge for any in­
sult was an unwritten law based on the concept that a man's hon-
41. See Walter Woodburn Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Life­
less Things in the Middle Ages and Modem Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696, 698 (1916); see also 
EDWARD P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF 
ANlMALS (1906); Paul Schiff Berman, Note, Rats, Pigs, and Statues on Trial: The Creation of 
Cultural Narratives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
288 (1994). 
42. See Ewald, supra note 40, at 1900-01. 
43. BRONISLA w MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1932). For 
criticism of Malinowski's methodology and findings, see sources cited infra note 61. 
44. MALINOWSKI, supra note 43, at 78. 
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our and that of his family had to be maintained intact."45 "The 
starting point for penal law was the mannhelgi, or a free man's le­
gally guaranteed immunity with regard to his person, property, 
honour, personal peace, and security. Every violation was con­
sidered an insult to the offended person, or to his family, and the 
offender, by committing his unlawful deed, automatically lost his 
immunity partly or totally, and became 6heilagr. This meant that 
in the event of revenge, nothing could be claimed for him by his 
family. The most appropriate response to violation was revenge, 
permitted everywhere, at any time, and upon any member of the 
opposing family."46 
• Under Japanese law of the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, 
local officials known as kendan were given extensive powers to 
enforce harsh theft laws. Under these laws, punishment extended 
to the thief's wife and children, in addition to the thief himself. 
According to one commentator, these laws tended to be enforced 
less for the purpose of deterring crime than for the purpose of en­
riching the kendan (and thereby preserving their place in the 
chain of power that ran from the emperor to the local samurai).47 
• The contemporary criminal justice system in Japan has as its prin­
cipal goal the "reintegration" of the offender into the community. 
As Daniel Foote has described, the Japanese criminal justice sys­
tem "place[ s] primary emphasis on reformation, which involves 
considering family circumstances, employment status, and other 
types of support mechanisms available to the offender, and, to a 
lesser extent, satisfaction of the victim. Confession also plays a 
key role . . .  as both a means to and reflection of the moral cathar­
sis of the individual deemed essential to true reform . . . . [The] 
approach is consciously benevolent to the extent that it reflects 
the view that generosity will generate feelings of gratitude and 
indebtedness, thereby encouraging offenders to rehabilitate 
themselves."48 Similar patterns of "benevolent" or "paternalistic" 
criminal justice have been observed in several Native American 
systems described by Karl Llewellyn.49 
45. Martina Stein-Wilkeshuis, Punishment in Iceland, A Survey, in RECUEILS DE LA 
SOCIETE JEAN BODIN POUR L'HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE DES INSTITUTIONS (Vol. LVI) -
LA PEINE 87 (1991). 
46. Id. at 89. 
47. See Shiro Ishii, Crime and Punishment: Japanese Traditions, in RECUEILS DE LA 
SOCIETE JEAN BODIN POUR L'HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE DES INSTITUTIONS (Vol. LVIII) 
- LA PEINE 411, 416 (1991). 
48. Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. 
L. REV. 317, 360 (1992). 
49. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, The Anthropology of Criminal Guilt, in JURISPRUDENCE, 
439-50 (1962). Llewellyn says that, in Cheyenne and New Mexican Pueblo culture, the pur-
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• One of the principal objects of penal law during the Chinese 
imperial period was to secure the enforcement of fundamental 
Chinese morality.50 "Lack of filial piety" and violation of 
mourning laws were both considered particularly serious offenses. 
For example, the Ch'ing code (1644-1911) provided that a person 
who concealed the death of a parent or husband and did not go 
into mourning was to be punished with penal servitude for one 
year and sixty blows with the heavy stick. Removal of the formal 
mourning garments before the requisite period had elapsed and 
indulgence in pleasures such as music or banqueting was to be 
punished with ninety blows from the heavy stick. The T'ang code 
( 618-907) imposed even harsher penalties for such offenses. 
Moreover, if a father beat his son to death and then secretly 
buried the body, the father was held liable not for the killing but 
for the secret burial.51 In addition, a child whose parent 
committed suicide could be held liable where the suicide could be 
attributed, even in the most.tenuous way, to unfilial conduct.52 
B. Applying Basic Concepts to the Test Cases 
There is much in these cases to distinguish them from contempo­
rary Western criminal law. In what follows, I focus on certain par­
ticularly intriguing details to illustrate both how Fletcher's theory 
works and where its limitations might lie. 
1. The Subject/Object Dichotomy and the Criminal Prosecution 
of Animals 
Can Fletcher's theory account for the historically observed practice 
of criminal prosecutions involving animals and inanimate objects? At 
one point, Fletcher seems to say no. According to Fletcher, "[a]ll legal 
systems concur that. punishment is imposed only for human action . . . .  
It is considered barbaric to punish animals for causing harm."53 In 
fact, however, this is merely a statement about positive law. (Despite 
the goal of digging beneath surface structure, Fletcher can hardly 
pose of the trial is to "bring the erring brother, now known to be such, to repentance, to 
open confession, and to reintegration with the community of which he was and still is re­
garded an integral part." Id. at 448 (emphasis in original). 
50. See GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADmONAL CHINESE LAW 52-68 
(1996). 
51. See id. at 61. 
52 See id. at 65. 
53. P. 44. Fletcher also deals with the prosecution of animals in Rethinking, in a some­
what different context See RETillNKING, supra note 1, at 343-49 (using history to illustrate 
distinction between "blaming" and "tainting" in law of forfeiture and homicide). 
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avoid characterizing and taking various positions on positive law). As 
it turns out, Fletcher's dichotomy theory may well be broad enough to 
accommodate such prosecutions. 
To deal with the question of prosecuting animals, we need to look 
to Chapter 3 of Basic Concepts; in which Fletcher discusses his dichot­
omy between treating defendants as "subjects" - as someone who 
acts, an end in himself - and treating them as "objects" - someone 
or something that is acted upon, a mere means to an end. Although 
not posed directly in positive criminal law, Fletcher says, this distinc­
tion underlies many disputes about defining and determining who is 
liable for committing an offense (p. 43). Retribution-based theories, 
under which a responsible agent is "called to account for his wrong­
doing," are consistent with the Kantian requirement that human be­
ings be treated as subjects, or ends in themselves. A deterrence-based 
theory, by contrast, treats a defendant as a mere object, a means to an 
end (p. 43). 
So how should we approach the criminal prosecution of animals 
and inanimate objects under Fletcher's theory? Three hypotheses 
suggest themselves. First, one might think that such prosecutions sim­
ply reflect the far end of the subject/object spectrum. Assuming that 
the purpose of such prosecutions is, if not to deter, then at least to in­
capacitate, one might argue that prosecuting and punishing animals is 
merely the most extreme manifestation of an object-based system of 
criminal justice, the clearest case of treating a defendant as a means to 
an end. Second, one might use Fletcher's theory as an occasion to 
look more deeply into the metaphysics of such prosecutions. Perhaps 
animal defendants were being viewed as subjects, as responsible moral 
agents, or ends-in-themselves. Or perhaps such trials were intended, 
as one scholar has put it, to restore the "moral equilibrium of the 
community [that] had been disturbed by the" crime and further the 
view "that somebody or something must be punished or else dire mis­
fortune . . .  would overtake the land."s4 Third, one might make the 
kind of argument that advocates of natural law have long favored -
namely, that despite their formal trappings, such prosecutions are "not 
really" criminal prosecutions after all, that they fall outside the uni­
verse of what Fletcher is attempting to describe.ss 
It is hard to say for sure which of these three approaches Fletcher 
would favor. His statement that "punishment is imposed only for hu­
man action" suggests that he would probably be sympathetic to the 
54. Hyde, supra note 41, at 698. Cf. Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological Approach 
to Modern Forfeiture Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects, 11 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 4-5 (1999) ("such legal proceedings permitted the co=unity to 
heal itself after the breach of a social norm by creating a narrative whereby a symbolic trans­
gressor of the established order was deemed to be 'guilty' of a 'crime' and cast beyond the 
boundaries of the society"). 
55. See, e.g., LON L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96-106 (rev. ed. 1969). 
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natural law, "not really" criminal law argument - one that, unfortu­
nately, suffers from circularity.56 
Whatever his favored response, though, it seems to me that 
Fletcher's theory does provide the analytical tools to address the ques­
tion posed. Whether a particular system allows for the criminal prose­
cution of animals and inanimate objects is ultimately a question about 
whether such defendants are regarded as subjects or objects. To find 
the answers, we would obviously have to examine the historical evi­
dence. The value of Fletcher's theory lies in the questions it leads us 
to ask. 
2. The Perpetration/Complicity Dichotomy and Mediaeval Icelandic 
and Japanese Law 
Chapter 11 of Basic Concepts offers a distinction between perpe­
tration and complicity. A perpetrator is the person who commits the 
actual actus reus of the crime. An accomplice is the one who counsels, 
assists, advises, or solicits (p. 188). The distinction is key to deter­
mining both how responsibility should be allocated among different 
participants in a common scheme, and the extent to which groups qua 
groups can be held liable for a crime. Here, again, Fletcher has some 
interesting observations on how this distinction is played out in posi­
tive law. Some ancient legal systems, he says, seem not to have recog­
nized accomplice liability at all. American and French law tend to 
support the view that perpetrators and accomplices should be treated 
equivalently. German and Russian law incline to the view that ac­
complices should be punished less severely (pp. 188-89). 
The question here is whether Fletcher's dichotomy can help ex­
plain the practice in mediaeval Icelandic and Japanese law of applying 
criminal sanctions not just to the person who actually committed the 
offense but also to members of the perpetrator's family. Put another 
way, does it make sense to speak of the perpetrator's family members 
as "accomplices"? Or is some other dynamic at work? 
At first glance, it seems obvious that family members per se cannot 
meet the requirement of complicity. Neither counseling, assisting, ad­
vising, nor soliciting is a prerequisite to liability. Their only crime, as 
it were, is that they happen to be related - a notion that strikes our 
modern, Western sensibilities as deeply unjust. On the other hand, 
under modern statutes, a parent can be held criminally liable for "im­
properly supervising," or "contributing to the delinquency of," a mi­
nor.57 Perhaps, one might think, the theory that underlies Icelandic 
56. For criticism of the natural law argument, see, for example, RONALD DWORKIN, 
LA W'S EMPIRE 102 (1986). 
57. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14: 92, 92.2 (West 1990). 
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and Japanese familial liability is similar to the theory that presumably 
underlies such statutes - that family members have certain duties or 
responsibilities to each other and that failing to prevent such criminal 
activity is a culpable breach of that duty. Perhaps. But it seems obvi­
ous that there is a significant moral difference between imposing li­
ability on a parent for the acts of a child and imposing liability on a 
child for the acts of a parent. 
One is left with the impression that familial liability in mediaeval 
Iceland and Japan lay somewhere outside the perpetration/complicity 
dichotomy. One would, of course, want to know more about the cir­
cumstances under which mediaeval Icelandic and Japanese law im­
posed criminal penalties on otherwise non-complicitous family mem­
bers. At a minimum, though, such liability is likely to put a strain on 
Fletcher's conceptual framework. 
3. The Punishment/Treatment Dichotomy, Malinowski's Trobriand 
Suicide, and the "Benevolent Paternalism" of Contemporary 
Japanese Criminal Justice 
In Chapter 2 of Basic Concepts, Fletcher seeks to formulate a uni­
versally applicable definition of "punishment" by contrasting that con­
cept to the notion of "treatment." The term "treatment" he uses to 
refer to assertedly nonpunitive coercive measures such as civil com­
mitment of the dangerously insane, deportation, disbarment, and im­
peachment and removal from office (p. 28). All of these measures, he 
says, are intended to "deprive an individual of the status that enables 
him or her to constitute a continuing social threat," rather than to 
"expiate or atone for" some crime (p. 29). 
But it is punishment - the "institution [that] provides the distin­
guishing features of criminal law" - that is Fletcher's main focus. 
Here, Fletcher begins, as he did in Rethinking,58 with H.L.A. Hart's 
famous positivistic account of punishment, consisting of five elements: 
(1) punishment must involve pain or other consequences normally 
considered unpleasant, (2) it must be for an offense against legal rules, 
(3) it must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense, (4) it 
must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the of­
fender, and (5) it must be imposed and administered by an authority 
constituted by a legal system against which the offense is committed.59 
Fletcher then "de-positivises" Hart's definition by emphasizing the 
phrase "for his offense" in the third element, and focusing on the con-
58. See FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 1, at 409-12. 
59. See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in H.L.A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1968). 
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ceptual link between the crime and the punishment. Punishment must 
be imposed for the criminal act. "Strictly speaking," Fletcher says, 
deportation for a heinous criminal act is not imposed for the criminal act; 
it is carried out for the sake of protecting the public. Disbarment and 
removal from office exhibit the same ambiguity. These sanctions may be 
imposed in response to criminal behavior but they are carried out for the 
sake of protecting the public. [pp. 34-35] 
So can Fletcher's theory account for the Trobriand Island and con­
temporary Japanese criminal law practices described above? Let us 
examine each system in turn. First, consider the Trobriand Islanders. 
How would Fletcher's theory deal with Malinowski's claim that the 
Trobriand islander who committed suicide after violating the tribe's 
incest taboo was applying a legally approved, apparently paradigmatic, 
penal sanction? Looking to Fletcher's rewriting of Hart's definition of 
punishment, we see that conditions 1 and 2 (that punishment involve 
pain or other unpleasant consequences and that it be of an actual of­
fender, respectively) are obviously both satisfied. So too, it seems, is 
condition 3 (that it be for an offense against legal rules). But, 
inasmuch as the suicide fails to satisfy condition 4 (that the punish­
ment be "intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
offender"), it clearly fails the Hart/Fletcher test. 
Even more troublesome, though, is condition 5. Would the suicide 
meet the requirement that it "be imposed and administered by an 
authority constituted by a legal system against which the offense is 
committed"? Here we can see the potential difficulty of finding em­
pirical evidence to confirm or disprove Fletcher's purportedly univer­
sal theory. Malinowski, for his part, regards the suicide as a paradig­
matic function of Melanesian criminal justice. In Melanesian society, 
he says, suicide has a "distinct legal aspect."60 Two methods of suicide 
are prescribed - lo'u Gumping off a palm tree) and soka (taking of 
poison from the gall bladder of a globe-fish). Festive dress and orna­
mentation are worn. The suicide in this case occurred "in the presence 
of a pronounced crime: the breach of totemic clan exogamy . . .  , one 
of the corner-stones of totemism, mother-right, and the classificatory 
system of kinship."61 
For Fletcher, then, the Trobriand suicide creates a dilemma analo­
gous to the one we saw above in the discussion of animal prosecutions. 
Either the suicide is regarded as "treatment," or it falls outside the 
punishment/treatment dichotomy entirely. 
60. MALINOWSKI, supra note 43, at 94. 
61. Id. at 78-79. For a skeptical view of Malinowski's assessment, see HOEBEL, supra 
note 35, at 177-210 (criticizing Malinowski's methodology); Peter Sack, Punishment in 
Melanesia and Kima'i's Suicide. Instead of a General Report, in RECUEILS DE LA Socn§.rn 
JEAN BODIN POUR L'HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE DES INSTITUTIONS {Vol. LVIII )- LA 
PEINE 421 {1991). 
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A similar, though subtler, problem occurs in the case of contempo­
rary Japanese criminal justice. The Japanese system is striking for the 
way in which it departs from our traditional Western notions of crimi­
nal justice. Rather than focus on either retribution or deterrence, the 
Japanese system emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration. Can 
Fletcher's theory account for it? 
Perhaps it can, but only with difficulty. On the one hand, the 
Japanese ideal seems far from the civil commitment, deportation, dis­
barment and impeachment of the "treatment" model. Whereas each 
of these processes is intended to separate the offender from society, 
the Japanese model is intended to do just the opposite - namely, to 
bring the offender back in. On the other hand, it is also probably 
wrong to speak of the Japanese ideal as involving "punishment." Al­
though the Japanese model does satisfy conditions 2-5 of the 
Hart/Fletcher test, it has difficulty satisfying condition 1 - that it "in­
volve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant" -
i.e., that it be punitive.62 Like the Trobriand suicide, then, the modem 
Japanese system of criminal justice seems to pose a serious challenge 
to Fletcher's universal theory. 
4. The Crime/Offender Dichotomy and Chinese Imperial Law 
Among the numerous puzzling issues raised by Chinese imperial 
criminal law is the harsh treatment meted out for what we would re­
gard as relatively minor acts of disobedience. A person who failed to 
show the proper filial piety or fulfill various mourning rites was subject 
to severe penalties. In light of modern criminal law, these practices 
seem aberrant. Once again we need to ask: To what extent can 
Fletcher's theory account for them? 
One approach to this puzzle can be found in Chapter 5 of Basic 
Concepts, which offers two sets of pertinent distinctions (both of which 
will be familiar to readers of Rethinking63). The first is between crime 
and offender. The term "crime" refers to an offense in the abstract. 
The term "offender" refers to an actual person who has committed a 
crime. The second distinction refers to two different ways in which a 
criminal act can be wrong - either through wrongdoing or wrongful­
ness. Wrongdoing involves the violation of a victim's interest. 
("Stabbing, poisoning, stealing, robbing, [and] breaking in all involve 
wrongdoing" (p. 78)). Wrongfulness involves the violation of a legal 
rule. (Homicide and theft involve wrongfulness (Id.)). As the crimi-
62. I say difficult, rather than impossible, because even the Japanese system will be 
viewed by some defendants as punitive. Although "benevolent" and "paternalistic," the 
Japanese system nevertheless entails both an intrusion on defendants' autonomy and some 
degree of stigma. Thus, it is not correct to say that it is entirely non-punitive. 
63. See FLETCHER, RETHINKING, supra note 1, at 455-59. 
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nal law has become increasingly a product of legislation (rather than 
judicial decisionmaking), Fletcher contends, its moral content has 
tended to shift from wrongdoing to wrongfulness. The purpose of 
punishing offenders, he says, "is rarely seen as an effort to restore the 
moral order of the universe. The primary purpose is to defend the 
authority of the state" (p. 80). 
So how should one characterize the moral content of Chinese im­
perial offenses such as failing to show proper filial piety and observe 
mourning rites? Having written previously about the significance of 
defiance as an element of moral content in the criminal law, I am sym­
pathetic to Fletcher's distinction between wrongdoing and wrongful­
ness.64 Nevertheless, it seems to me that Fletcher's moral matrix is still 
too simplistic to account for criminal offenses of this sort. In Chinese 
society, of course, lack of filial piety and failure to fulfill mourning 
rights did involve violations of a legal rule. But they also involved 
more. In addition to the two kinds of moral content Fletcher identifies 
- violations of a particular victim's interests and violations of a legal 
rule - we need also to consider harm to society's institutions and 
violation of moral (as opposed to legal) norms.65 Although moral con­
tent of these sorts is often associated with the understandably contro­
versial criminalization of "morals offenses" (such as gambling, adul­
tery, and prostitution), it is also essential to uncontroversial criminal 
offenses such as contempt, perjury, and obstruction of justice. Here, 
in the context of lack of filial piety and failure to fulfill mourning rites, 
it is precisely these two forms of moral content that would appear to 
be present. 
Fletcher's failure to offer a sufficiently broad account of moral 
content also explains why his claim regarding the historical shift from 
wrongdoing to wrongfulness is faulty. As we have seen, the history of 
mediaeval Chinese law exemplifies a pattern of development that is 
precisely the converse of Fletcher's claim (i.e., a shift from wrongful­
ness to wrongdoing, rather than the other way around). A longer and 
wider comparative law perspective helps to show why the historical 
trends are actually more complicated than implied by Fletcher's ac­
count. 
CONCLUSION: "RETHINKING" BASIC CONCEPTS 
Criticizing George Fletcher for being insufficiently comparativist is 
a bit like denigrating the Pope for being insufficiently Catholic. It has 
not been my intention to do so here. Rather, I have sought to go be­
yond the contemporary Anglo-American and European context in 
64. See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminali· 
zation and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997). 
65. See id. (discussing both kinds of moral content). 
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which Fletcher often works masterfully, in order to test the specifically 
universal and timeless claims of his theory. 
Fletcher himself has recognized the need for such expanded analy­
sis. In the coming years, one can look forward to foreign editions of 
Basic Concepts augmented by local criminal law materials. (It is un­
clear, though, whether any non-Western systems will be included.) In 
the meantime, we can begin to assess the validity of Fletcher's claims 
through an admittedly piecemeal and preliminary process of analysis. 
The results of that initial assessment, I believe, are mixed. A brief 
and anecdotal look at selected historical practices in Japan, Iceland, 
China, Melanesia and elsewhere reveals a bewilderingly complex 
range of conduct involving what we would recognize as criminal law: 
animals and inanimate objects subject to prosecution and punishment, 
suicide serving as a recognized criminal sanction, radically divergent 
ideas about the purpose of criminal justice, non-complicit family 
members being held liable for criminal acts of a related perpetrator, 
and severe sanctions imposed for relatively minor acts of disobedi­
ence. 
One is left, I hope, with a sense of how varied criminal law prac­
tices can be, and how difficult it is to construct a universal theory. The 
reader cannot help but be impressed by what Fletcher has achieved. 
Although Fletcher's claims to universality sometimes overreach, his 
dichotomy theory is rich enough to provide the tools for analyzing 
many of the examined anomalies. As the project to publish Basic 
Concepts in various foreign editions takes shape, this richness should 
become increasingly evident. 
